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The Other Heading: Husserl, Spirit, Crisis
By MichaelJ. McGandy
Fordham University
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The crisis of European existence can end in only one of two ways: in
the ruin of a Europe alienated from its rational sense of life, fallen into
a barbarian hatred of spirit; or in the rebirth of Europe from the spirit
of philosophy, through a heroism of reason that will definitely overcome naturalism. Europe's greatest danger is weariness.
- Edmund Husserl, Vienna Lecture
We are younger than ever, we Europeans, since a certain Europe does
not yet exist. Has it ever existed? And yet we are like these young .
people who get up, already old and tired. We are already exhausted.
-Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading
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The question of the Vienna Lecture is posed once again: what is to become
of the project of European humanity? In May of 1935, in a soon to be provincial
capital of the German Reich, Husserl spoke against a barbarism that had turned
itself away from the origin of Europe and thus forsook the spiritual telos of
European humanity. In the wake of Husserl's death that barbarism fell upon all
of the territories surrounding Berlin, resulting in a global strife in which the
question of the European identity would be exiled for near half a century. Yet,
in this last decade of the twentieth century, both the fire and ice of that global
conflict have receded. Europe now stands free-appears to stand free and
once again questions can be asked meaningfully regarding what the continent
is and what it could be in the future. The question thus remains: what is to
become of the project of European humanity? However, while this question of
Husserl's is of vital importance once again, we can perhaps now begin to ask
what, exactly, the meaning of posing this question is.
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This reversal of the point of the question is of philosophic and political
significance. It is the question posed by one philosopher, Derrida, to another,
Husserl, across time and across tradition regarding the very standing of the

phenomenological project, its logical form, and its ontological presuppositions.1Our asking is philosophical in that, insofar as we examine the character
of Husserl's question, we will be examining the question of "being."2 The asking
is political, however, in that it reorients our perspective on the very prospect of
a European project. The question mark no longer abides at the end of the
, interrogative sentence, but moves forward and places itself next to humanity?,
European?, project? Our question, Derrida's question, comes toward the interlocutor and asks him, not to justify a possible answer to his own question, but
to justify the question itself. Our asking is political because the very p utting of
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the question unsettles current discourse surrounding the would-be identity of
Europe and demands that it justify itself, if that is at all possible.
It is through this dual quality of our questioning of the question that we will
have recourse to Derrida's recent "political essay" The Other Heading, as well as
his earliest thinking on Husserlian phenomenology, especially as exhibited in
SpeechandPhenomena.3 JustasHusserl'squestionremainspertinentandreveals
much about the status of Europe today, Derrida's examinations of transcendental phenomenology also remain pertinent, if not crucial, to his lates~, more
explicitly political writings. The juxtaposition of Speech and Phenomena and The
Other Heading shows that this recent writing is not just an exceedingly lengthy
piece of journalism, but that the explanation for placing Europe within quotation mar.ks-and not just provisionally-is immanent within Derrida's critique
of Husserl's whole notion of there being a crisis of European spirit and his
analysis of Husserl's phenomenological ontology.
This essay, then, is an attempt at explicating the significance and revealing
the possibilities of Derrida's critique of Husserl with an outlook toward the
current ethical and political situation in Europe.4 The crux of this explanation,
or investigation, will be the terms "spirit" and "crisis," their presuppositions,
implications, and political uses. Indeed, as Derrida notes, the posing of the
question of the crisis of spirit joins the Europe of 1935 with this Europe, today's
Europe of 1993 in a parallelism that bears careful consideration.5
Husserl's Crisis, Today's Crisis
The point of departure for this essay is best found in a strategic movement
of the question mark within the texts of Husserl that will enable us to open up
the scope and significance of these writings. Indeed, we need to reiterate the
questions suggested above: what is humanity for Husserl? What is Europe? But
we may also ask: what is barbarism? And what is crisis? In what do these
negative appellations and descriptions consist? It is with these latter questions
that we will proceed, as H~erl himself does, and thereby open the general
topic of Husserl's question about the future of European humanity.

At the outset of The Crisis of European Sciences Husserl describes the
moment of crisis as a situation which "meant an indifferent turning away from
the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity."6 The questions
which Husserl is indicating are those which concern origins, and not the
technical or practical questions which we pose or confront in our day-to-day
living. We have, within the twentieth century, turned away from the questions
regarding origins, Husserl claims, through a forgetting of the European tradition which stands upon the culture of ancient Greece and the revival of the
science of origins during the Renaissance.7 This forgetting, this turning away
has been exacerbated and accompanied by Europe's positive acceptance of two
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counter-sciences, or philosophies: naturalism and Weltanschauung. These two
approaches, in Husserl's estimation, have forsaken the task of original thinking
and have fallen into the worst sort of technical or mysticized thought. Naturalism became so enthralled with the developments of the early modem sciences
as to give itself completely over to the pursuit of "facts," while failing to
consider the question of origins. This positivistic approach unreflectively
placed all of being within a spatio-temporal grid and forgot the "higher
dignity" of those questions which precede matters of fact. 8 Weltanschauung
philosophy, on the other hand, following on the historicist and perspectivist
tendencies of the nineteenth century, sought to temporalize the question of
origins; Hegel, at one extreme, and Nietzsche at his opposite, are emblematic of
the historicist tendency that Husserl is critiquing. Husserl, however, responds
to this development with the assertion that the truths of science are neither
created, evolved, nor dissolved by history. 9 Insofar as naturalism and
Weltanschauung are descriptive of the intellectual and cultural currents of
twentieth century Europe, the notion of and search for a genuine humanitythat is, a humanity of origins-has been lost. What results is a humanity that is
nothing more than an assemblage of facts and data (as in psychology) or an
insubstantial historical construction about which no ultimately true, atemporal
statements can be made. Either way, the question of origins has been obscured.
The loss of this question and vocation stands as our failure to remain on the path
to the true answering of the question of who "we Europeans" are.
Husserl likens the trajectory of contemporary Europe not only to a falling
off or forgetfulness of the proper path of science and philosophy, but to a true
loss of faith. In the Crisis he writes:

If man loses this faith it means nothing less than the loss of faith "in
himself," in his own true being. This true being is not something which
he always already has, with the self-evidence of the '1 am," but
something he only has and can have in the form of a struggle for his
truth, the struggle to make himself true. 10
To lose faith is to lose the particularly European vocation of seeking origins.
Moreover, insofar as one loses this faith one has lost one's identity since Husserl
draws a strict relation between this vocation and the self, the "European man."
This loss, then, is what constitutes barbarism and the oncoming of the crisis.
Like the ancient Greeks-who are named as the spiritual forebears of European
humanity in the Crisis-Husserl identifies as barbarian that which does not
participate in the same identity, in a self-same relationship with the European
community. The barbaric is that which threatens European humanity, and its
culture of philosophy as rigorous science, from without and, most significantly,
from within. 11 Indeed, while the vast continent of Asia is populated with
''barbarians," it is not their existence that precipitates the European crisis.12
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Rather, the crisis is located around the infections of n aturalism and
Weltanschauung philosophy within the borders, the spiritual corpus of Europe
itself. Thus Husserl's distinction between the barbaric and that which belongs
to the common community, differs from the distinction employed by the
Greeks. The community of European humanity is not one of blo0d or fealty, but
a spiritual community linked to the possibility for and the achievement of the
rational vocation of original thinking. Significantly, the spiritual community of
which Husserl writes has exactly the characteristics of being "supra-national"
and universal. 13 For this reason Husserl does not fear external assaults, but,
rather, decay from within; it is the "European" barbarians such as the naturalists, the Weltanschauung philosophers, and the National Socialists that are
Husserl's concern.
This forgetfulness of both the thought of origins and the project of seeking
origins which characterizes the barbaric is founded on a mistaken or one-sided
rationalism. Such limited rationalism looks upon empirical facts or uncriticized
appearances as the original matter of know ledge and being, and hegemonically
sets them over and against other intetpretations of the world. As opposed to this
defective form of rationalism, the faith in oneself, the "true being" that Husserl
identifies is located in an universal rationalism that seeks to perform reductions, foundational investigations, on all the phenomena brought forth by onesided rationalism. As distinguished from limited rationalism, this universal
reason, or transcendental phenomenology, is the pursuit of the origin of
cognition in the intending transcendental subject and of the objects that this
subject intends; the concern of phenomenology is not the appearance, which the
other sciences fixate upon, but the ideal conditions for the possibility of the
phenomenal appearance. Transcendental phenomenology delves through the
layers of the sedimentation toward the core of consciousness, while one-sided
rationality is content to remain amidst the play of phenomena on the surface. 14
The distinction which establishes the difference between transcendental
phenomenology and the sciences of one-sided rationalism, then, is that between universality and finitude. Unlike one-sided rationalism, phenomenology is universal in its scope and in the duration of its activity. Transcendental
critique "places in question all experience as such" and thus is not a specialized
field or discipline.15 Further, phenomenology is universal for the fact that its
task of critically analyzing appearances is infinite. The object of pursuit in
transcendental analysis is not the atomic object that has the particular and finite
qualities that the empirical scientist would claim that we can seize and possess.
Rather, transcendental phenomenology investigates the horizon of possibilities
of a particular object of knowledge, a horizon that can only be consumed by
infinite investigation. In his essay,Philosophy as Rigorous Science, Husserl writes:
Everything psychical which is thus an "experienced" is, then, as we
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can say with equal evidence, ordered in an overall connection, in a
"monadic" unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself has nothing at
all to do with nature, with space and time or substantiality and
causality, but has its thoroughly peculiar "forms." It is a flow of
phenomena, unlimited at both ends, traversed by an intentional line
that is, as it were, the index of the all-pervading unity. It is the line of
an immanent "time" without beginning or end, a time that no chronometers measure.16
The ideal object sought is not to be seized, and phenomenology can only follow
its train in the infinite expanses of the past and future. While it is not a complete
science in the sense of representing a body of axiomatic knowledge, the activity
of this universal and infinite pursuit of the ultimate objects and origins of
experience Husserl believes to be the proper and commanding ground for
every specific science. In forwarding transcendental phenomenology as rigorous science Husserl would not seem to be eliminating the diversity of the
European sciences, but eliminating their divisiveness; since it is not a one-sided
rationality, phenomenology does not seek to displace other sciences, but seeks
to anchor them in the activity of original thinking. In transcendental phenomenology all scientific practitioners, all theorists, all Europeans can find the
ground of their knowledge and practice. The vocation of European humanity,
then, is to establish "a scientific essential knowledge of consciousness, toward
that which consciousness itself 'is' according to its essence." 17
The crisis of European humanity is located precisely in its failure to seek
these origins or essences through transcendental analysis; the crisis is the failure .
to seek a "philosophy from the ground up. " 18 In remaining ignorant of origins,
in persisting in their one-sided rationality, Husserl wants to say that the
Europeans of the twentieth century are creating a dark night of divisiveness and
strife amongst what ought to be a spiritual community that w ould struggle in
order to achieve Europe's true being. However, this poverty of the continent's
sciences is based on a deeper poverty. The origin that Europe is most dangerously ignorant of is its own spiritual origin in ancient Greece, the cultural milieu
where the infinite task of seeking essences was begun and founded on the
"universality of the critical standpoint." 19 This insight into true universality
Husserl holds to be intrinsic to the Greco-European spirit and, as such, original
to the spirit of no other people. Universality, Husserl claims, is not an original
feature of the Indian or Chinese spirit, and only comes to those peoples via a
process of "Europeanization." Thus, the crisis of European humanity is not
ex~ctly a failure to reach a goal or attain an identity that has been set out before
this segment of humanity as a mere possibility. Rather, the crisis marks a failure
of Europe to recognize its original and true identity as an universal, philosophic
~p~e. Without this more primordial sense of origins, the taking up of original
thinking through transcendental phenomenology is impossible. As Husserl
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writes in the text of his Vienna Lecture: "Precisely this lack of genuine rationality
on all sides is the source of what has become for man and unbearable unclarity
regarding his own exiStence and his in.finite tasks. "20
The dynamic of identity and true knowledge-which is forgotten in this
state of crisis-is in a sense circular, or, better, reflexive. The origin does not
represent some provisional, incomplete, or indefinite starting point. Rather, the
origin- both in Husserl's anthropology and his epistemology-is a full, complete, and ideal present. Through phenomenological reduction we find ~a~ the
object that we consciously experience is originally intended as an ideal obJect.
For example, when we have an experience of a particular ball we are more
primordially, and necessarily, intending an ideal and original notion of ball, or
ball "as such." The particular ball that we experience, with its accidents and
imperfections, can only be compared with the telos of the perfect ball, the ball
"as such," insofar as this ideal ball was already at the origin of our intentional
experience of the particular object. Through phenomenological reduction we
find that the telos is nothing other than the original and ideal object circling
around in front of our experience providing direction and continuity to our
reasoning about empirical objects. In this way the telos is a reflection of the ideal
object which is at the origin of intention.21 Likewise, when phenomenology is
applied to European humanity, Husserl's reduction finds that the telos of
Europe is its origin. And, insofar as Europe is lost in one-sided rationality, that
telos is to return to its origin through the activity of a progressive futural science.
These origins revealed through the phenomenological reduction are not
temporalized, not effected by history, but abide in a living present at the origin
of European humanity's trajectory through time. Most significantly for our
essay, this location of a living present as both the origin and telos of European
humanitysetstheEuropeansapartasaspiritualpeople,apeoplewithadefinite
and indissoluble identity. This identity Husserl considers to be that of original
thinkers, a culture founded on original thought.
The task of European humanity, then, is to seek to rejoin its original and
true spiritual identity. The crisis that Husserl speaks of on the eve of the German
provincialization of Czechoslovakia and Austria was Europe's inability to
retrieve this ideal origin of Greek humanity. Thus, in a contemporary Europe
bereft of a notion of its proper telos, the striving for identity became chaotic or
was forsaken entirely; the true reflection between arche and telos was interrupted by the deep ignorance in which Europe turned away from transcendental analysis.
Today's crisis-or the renewal of a crisis that was suspended during the
wars of Europe, both hot and cold-is founded on nothing other than the
revival of the question of what Europe is and what its telos ought to be. Indeed,
the crisis that can be said to mark this post-Cold War Europe is the unques-
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tioned taking up of this question, once again. What we are witnessing is a
multitude of ethnic, religious, and political factions bringing to life Husserl's
question and projecting/ remembering an identity that is "Europe." Derrida
presents the situation of Europe in The Other Heading, and asks this question:
Whatimminence? Something unique is afoot in Europe, in what is still
called Europe even if we no longer know very well what or who goes
by thisname. Indeed, towhatconcept, towhatrealindividual, to what
singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who will draw up
its borders?22
Who will speak for Europe and what Europe is to be spoken for? More than a
half century after Husserl's Vienna Lecture the question of Europe is being
posed, once again, as a question of identity. Dangerously, the question is being
put forward by a culture that is bereft of original-or, non-original-thinking.
Once again, the struggle that is arising is one which contests what that land
mass', that "spiritual body's" true identity is. Once again, in Vienna, Prague,
Berlin, and Paris the question is being asking if that city is a capital, and a capital
of what? Or are these cities provincial outposts, but then, of what greater entity?
Once again we ask: what is Europe and what is European humanity?
The N on-Originary Origin
For the moment we will let this reiteration of Husserl's question linger and
approach the topic of crisis and spirit from another, perhaps more oblique
angle. Yet, in now turning our attention to Derrida's Speech and Phenomena it
could be said that we are simply continuing the discussion of the previous
section. The specific locale of crisis, however, has shifted from that of Europe to
that of writing. In this shift the question of Europe appears to wait unattended,
whereas, in fact, the concerns which led us to this initial question continue to be
explored and their implications deepened. The struggle between European
humanity and barbarism is paralleled here in Derrida's consideration of
Husserl's understanding of the relation between speech and indication, between phone andgraphe. Through a radical but crucial shift in registers what we
will find is thatthe question of Europe as posed by H~erl is nothing other than
~token of phonocentricism, a privileging at the outset of the phenomenological
Investigation of a metaphysics of presence over and against the possibility of a
grammatology.23 In working through the issue of speech and writing what we
will see is that the barbarism that Husserl fears is nothing other than a
subspecies of non-phonetic signification, or writing. As Derrida announces:
''The moment of crisis is always the moment of signs. " 24

Derrida'scritiqueofHusserlianphenomenologyisafundamentalcritique,
~critique which draws the very logical structure of phenomenological analysis
Into question. Insofar as the goal of phenomenological reduction is to locate a
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pure and present object which is said to be at the core of our inte~tion~ ~ctivity,
Derrida offers a dual challenge in Speech and Phenomena. First, it 1S to. be
questioned whether Husserl has not misrepresente~ ~e .pheno~enological
pursuit when he places it under the title of being~ inf~te task. If we ~e
temporalization and the iteration of experienced objects seriously, the possibility of performing even an infinite reduction that would reach a purely p~es~nt,
ideal object begins to take on the character of an impossibili!Y. The pro1~ction
of a pure present at the end of the infinite task of Euro~ean ~cience-th~t is, the
employment of the Idea in the Kantian sense-Derrida finds to be s~ply a
response to the threat of a temporalized analysis ~f phenom~ology; in the
desire to preserve that pure present which eludes us in our reflection upon p ast
experience transcendental phenomenology deceptively casts it ahead, beyond
·
to
experience,
as a futural possi.bility ·25 Second, even if we were to concede
.
Husserl the possibility or reality of such a pure pr~ent, th~ question ~en
becomes what it could possibly mean to intuit such an ideal 0~1ect. As ~e~ida
makes clear in the latter chapters of his analysis, and particularly ~ 'The
Supplement of Origin," the possibility of such .a p~ present having .any
meaning is doubtful; it is more likely that such an ideality would be .t he eclipse
of meaning, or death itself. In order to lay the basis for returrui:~ ~o 0':11'
discussion of Europe we need to consider both of these levels of cnttcism ID
more depth.
In pursuing the task of challenging the pu~e ide~~ o~ the teleology of
consciousness that was initiated by Derrida's claim that it is simply a respo~se
to the threat posed by a temporalized consideration of phenomenologic~
analysis, the task becomes to show the degree to w~ich ~henomenology 1S
"tormented" from within; we need to examine the way in which tr~enden~
phenomenology is always and already internally beset by barbaric culture.
That is to say, we must show how the Idea in the Kantian sense only conceals
the impossibility of this ideality. Conversely, the basis for any argument for the
possibility of the phenomenological critique reaching a pure presen~ must,
then, rest on certain foundational distinctions which will attempt precisely to
maintain the dignity of presence. To this end, it is Husserl's fundamen~
concern to distinguish the meaningful forms of essential consciousn~ 1Il
expression from the non-expressive or non-meaningful indicative function of
signs. The class of meaningful expressions and the class of merely sen~e
producing signs are further distinguished by i:-iusserl'~ di:aw~g of~ .s tnct
relation between expression and the human v01ce. The indicative acti~ity of
signs, on the other hand, is linked with non-vocal or written figures. ~~ the
written sign only motivates us, points us toward another object which itself
grounds meaning, speech is constitutive of meaning itself in that it is b~t the
exteriorization (ex-pression) of a meaning-generating intentional co~saous
ness. In speech we give meaning to the world; we want to say som~~g and,
thereby, intend the world with a definite meaning. Everything which is not of

disQosure: Fin de Siec/e Democracy

Husserl, Spirit, Crisis 41
this essential vocal form- that is, signs, symbols, graphe- are meaningful only

insofar as they are in the service or under the control of voice. Upon Husserl's
reading, untouched or unanimated by voice, signs lie dormant and are without
meaning. Yet, importantly, such "dead" signs are not without significance.
As Derrida remarks in his discussion of Husserl's distinction between
expression and indication, even a cursory consideration of speech suggests that
it is a highly complicated structure within which one cannot make strict
separations or distinctions between expression and indication; in cpmmunicative speech the functions of expression and indication appear to be intimately
related and inter-meshed. Once a Husserlian meaning intention is "expressed"
it loses its purity and becomes mixed with signs-gestures, lettering, symbols-that have other possibilities than simply being the means by which this
particular meaning intention is related. Signs belong to a public and
intersubjective sphere in which they are useful precisely for their variable and
indeterminate character. What is clear, however, is that Husserl must distinguish the two and find a direct connection between vocal expression and the
living present of subjective consciousness. The weight and importance of this
distinction, the necessity of it to Husserl's project, is apparentwhen we broaden
the field to terms to which "voice" is analogous in the Husserlian vocabulary.
The cluster of analogous and often interchangeable terms that Husserl uses
along with voice are: spirit, breath, and life.27 Voice is implicated in this group
of terms which are all suggestive of being, of a primordial being present. What
voice carries with it, what it itself is, then, is the origin which constitute~
meaning prior to any appearance in the world. Derrida writes, introducing his
critique:
For it is not in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, in the
body of speech in the world, that he will recognize an original affinity
with the logos in general, but in the voice phenomenologically taken,
speech in its transcendental flesh, in the breath, the intentional animation that transforms the body of the word into flesh, makes the Karper
a Leib, ageistige Leiblichkeit. The phenomenological voice would be this
spiritual flesh that continues to speak and be present to itself-to hear
itself-in the absence of the world.28
The voice, as life, exists as an ontologically necessary precursor to all appearances, all expressive and indicative activity. The voice is what conserves
meaning in that it is the pure origin of meaning. As such, the full presence of
voice is cast ahead as the promise of a pure teleological ideality that can be
~ached via a phenomenological analysis which strips away the dead layers of
signs. This ontological assertion provides Husserl with the theoretical leverage
to prise expression loose from the dead indicative signs that it is bound up w ith
in communicative speech.
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However, without this grounding of voice in life itself, all speech and
written systems that appear to rely on voice would be unable to offer that
promise and would be characterized by a non-substantial play of indication. In
Husserl's estimation, as long and only as long as voice vitiates expression, and
other forms of communication, the promise of ideality is preserved. Considering the grouping of terms surrounding the Husserlian concept of voice, the
threat posed by in dication and writing is clear. If speech is the repository of life,
of being present, writing is death and the eclipse of meaning. Once tha~ living
present is embodied in written signs and symbols it is set at a distance from the
breath which conserves its meaning. And once that distance between intended
meaning and written sign becomes apparent the misinterpretation, the forgetfulness, and the utter death of the meaning intention all become possible.29 A
sign, a written symbol cut off from the meaning intention which gave it life
offers no prospect for intuition, but gives itself over to non-teleological, nontruth-guided interpretation. In this way the dead sign remains dangerously and
critically significant. This, then, is the moment of crisis in classical and Husserlian
semiology: when a sign is so distant from the meaning intention after which it
was patterned as to lend itself to interpretation in the absence of that origin/
telos.30 This is the moment of strife and conflicting interpretation without the
hope of a mediating or ruling principle.
The question Derrida poses regarding Husserl's distinction between expression and indication, speech and sign, is whether, in fact, expression is not
always already" contaminated" by signification such that the "introduction" of
indication to expression does not constitute a moment of crisis.31 The point
which Derrida presses in the chapter "Meaning as Soliloquy" is that all
manifested, communicative acts of internal consciousness, insofar as they
appear in space and time, are indicative. Moreover, it is important to note that
indication does not just inhabit public speech, but abides in soliloquy as well.
Both space and time are fields of differentiation and, for this reason, not even
Husserl's monadic subject of time consciousness escapes differentiation and
dispersion.32 The internal voice, the spoken word, the gesture, the written word,
insofar as they are spatio-temporal appearances, all resist the reduction to a
pure present and the sloughing off of their indicative "shell."
Husserl can thus think that some elements of a substantially discursive order (word, parts of speech in general) function in certain cases
as indicative signs. And this indicative function of speech is everywhere at work. All speech inasmuch as it is engaged in communication and manifests lived experience, operates as in dication. In this way
words act like gestures. Or rather, the very concept of gesture would
have to be determined on the basis of indication as what is not
expressive.D
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Once the living consciousness see.ks to manifest itself-even if only to itselfit has begun to exile itself into the world of signs and indication. The very breath
that gives life to our words is receding as the phone is exhaled; truly, they begin
to expire. The term "crisis" suggests that this intermixture, this losing of
meaning in indication is a state of degradation and a state that can be circumvented or from which we can recuperate through a proper application of
phenomenological analysis. What Derrida's criticism reveals is the contrary.
Insofar as this task of phenomenology is being pursued in the intersubjective
sphere-including the subject speaking to itself- which demands the exteriorization of meaning, it is inevitably caught in a field of signification that founds
its movement not on presence but on absence which functions in the play of
spaces and the inter-relation of differences.
The infinite task of phenomenology, which is to get to the living core of
consciousness and the objects intended by consciousness, then, is more aptly
described as an impossible task. At this level of critique the question of crisis is
rendered moot in that indication and difference are an inescapable part of all
speech, and even would be necessary for a purely present subjectto reveal itself
to itself. The "pure" moment that is revealed in the "blink of an eye" only gains
its circumscription and self-identity by the distinct space that the blinking of the
eye creates.34 Further, internal speech, insofar as it is discursively saying
something, would be contaminated by indication for the very same reasons that
externalized speech is. The spacing and difference which are generally taken to
be characteristic of writing, then, are not the moment of crisis in which the origin
is lost, but the very means by which meaning is enabled to appear.
Thus the infinite task of phenomenology that declares itself to be the
teleological pursuit of a pure present (the Idea in the Kantian sense) is deeply
problematic insofar as that task unfolds in time and by means of speech which
is inevitably caught up in systems of indication. Yet, there is the second level of
Derrida's critique that we only sketched at the outset of this section. Even if
every expression or discursive rendering of meaning were instantaneously
~ntaminated by signs and writing, there is still the possibility that in the pure
~teriority of the subject there is a living present that speaks without signs. This
IS the reduction to the interior monologue which Derrida characterizes as a self
that is immediately present to itself and, thus, no longer needs signs to point
toward an existence.35 There would be no spatiality or temporality in this selfpresent subject, no gaps or differences, and so all communication becomes
superfluous or useless. Thus the voice of the pure subject keeps silent and
resides in an unmediated and simple "is"; this subject is being itself, metaphysically understood.
The question that Derrida asks is whether, given this description of the
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pure subject as simple, unmediated, self-present, and silent, this original/
teleological living present is not more appropriately thought of as death. The
total being which the living present represents in its completeness is without
feature, difference, or motion; in its full being it is nothing. At the close of Speech
and Phenomena Derrida writes:
The history of metaphysics therefore can be expressed as the unfolding of the structure or schema of an absolute will-to-hear-oneselfspeak. This history is closed when this infinite absolute appears to
itself as its own death. A voice without differance, a voice without
36
writing, is at once absolutely alive and absolutely dead.
Indeed, the close of Derrida's critique of Husserlian phenomenology is a
complete shifting of registers from presence to absence. The condition for the
possibility of meaning is no longer Husserl's living present, but is located in the
death of the subjectthatwas first thought to be the ground of meaning. Meaning
generated through indicative activity, if it is to have any point, necessitates the
death or absence of its subject. Yet, what we find in following out the logic of
semiology is that this subject is not just temporarily or practically absented, but
is, at its very "core," absented or dead; in that self-same "core" the life-giving
activity of indication ceases and, thus, there never was and never will be a
meaningful subject other than the dead or absented subject. Because of this,
Derridaisabletoaffectthedisplacementoftheclusterofphone,speech,identity,
and life with the new cluster of grame, writing, difference, and death.
The radical shifting from the paradigm of life to that of death within
Derrida's critique and working out of the structure of Husserlian phenomenology is founded on standard paradigm of classical semiology. The earlier
consideration of communicative speech showed how we could not actually
separate or distinguish expression from indication. Based on this inevitable
inter-relation, all speech with reference to an object or to the speaking subject
is engaged in indication at some level and, as such, is pointing to something
which is not immediately present. The very meaning of signs within cl~ical
analysis is to stand in for a currently absented presence, to serve as a supplement to what is currently not present. In Husserl's case, speech, in its expression, still is said to point to an ideal object or pure subject. Both classical and
Husserlian semiology, then, presuppose distance, separation, and absence
within the very structure which purports to arrive at that which Husserl would
like to describe as a unified and living present. However, what we found when
we considered the pure object at which both classical semiology and Husserlian
phenomenology seek to arrive is that all semiosis, all communication ceases in
the sphere of pure presence. Semiosis, as the structu.r e of life and meaninggiving activity, is impossible at the point of pure presence since there is no
distance or difference to motivate it. The death or absence of the subject, as
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D~ida~ote~, is th.us the "~tructural necessity to the pronouncing of the I";37 or,
to link this pomtw1th our first analysis: voice is not contaminated by m· d" ti.
fo th" · di · "
ica on,
~ is ~ ,,~atlve contamination" is all there is to voice. To indicate oneself
~1~ the I 1s only to say that one is not fully present. More radically, the "I"
~1gnifies that one has never been fully present and, thus, has never been alive
~ ~strong metaphysical sense. The world in which we live and communicate

m IS not only "plagued" by absence and difference, but is "founded" on this
absence.

. Thus Sp~ch and.~henomena brings us to a point where we ha~e to reconsider the notion_ of crlSls a~~ being ignorant of, or a being distant from origins.
The ground of life and a~t1v1ty ~o~s not appear to be an original presence, but,
rather,
·n h an absence and differentiation which Derrida will term "d;R:,;,.
':IJ~,ance. "We
~ .ave to turn.
a consideration of differance and its significance for out
thinking about crts1s more closely in the next section. However, it should be
clear
· ·
. . that an acceptance
. .
. of differance as the "ground, " as the non-or1gmary
~ngm. of our hvmg will amount to "challenging the very form of the question"
m which Husserl proposes the issue of crisis.38

n:'

Differance: Crisis Reconsidered
Re-a~proaching the question of Europe and the crisis of spirit, it is evident

that.the difference between Husserl's and Derrida's philosophical methodology 18 not that the former proposes that we take up the issue of origins and that
th~ l~tter,;schews the importance of what we have termed here as "original
~g. Rather, both of these Europeans ask us to think originally or in
Derrida's case, "originally." The difference is that Derrida does not th~ that
we can__take up Husserl's call to origins through transcendental phenomenology naively·
· · 1tse
· If has to be put to criticism prior to any
. . , the issue o f origins
questio~g of the possibility of an origin or telos of Europe. Thus in his
In~~on to ;1~e:l's Dri_gin of Geometry Derrida speaks of Husserl as
~bl
ting a naivete of a higher level' or an investigator become irresponSl e"·1 Dem"da goes on to refer to him as one who "was a stranger to history"
an~, as such, "inc~pab~e of taking it seriously." 39 Which is to say, Husserl is
~=~ropagatmg his own ?ne-sided rationality. To act responsibly and to
.
. to Europe and the history of Europe requires that we pause even at
a point prior to Husserlian original thinking.

11

of :peech and P~omena is where the notion of origin is itself made the object
.P . ~omenological (non)reduction and it is in that text that we find that the
~itself is never originary, that a reduction in the proper sense is impossible.
at ~fun
e refer to as an origin, insofar as it is significant, is only revealed by a
more
damen
tal,,
.
dia l" structure of absence and difference.
That H
.
. . and "p~or
bee ~rlian ongm of the hvmg present which we found to lack significance
ause It would reside in an undifferentiated pure presence is, in fact, the death
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and absence upon which all systems of signification are "founded." This
dynamic in which that which is absent serves as an "origin"-as the nonoriginary origin since it is never and cannot be made present-of all appearances is that quasi-transcendental structure of differance as differentiation in the
fields of both space and time. 40 Derrida approaches and, then, veers away from
the possibility of transcendentalizing differance:
Constituting itself, dynamically dividing itself, this interval [differance]
is what could be called spacing; time's becoming spatial or spac~'s
becoming temporal (temporalizing). And it is this constitution of the
present as a "primordial" and irreducibly nonsimple, and, therefore,
in the strict sense nonprimordial, synthesis of traces, retentions, and
protentions (to reproduce here, analogically and provisionally, a
phenomenological and transcendental language that will bepres~~tly
· be revealed as inadequate) that I propose to call protowr1tmg,
prototrace, or differance.41
The point here is not to replace one transcendental structure with another;
differance cannot be another transcendental structure in which being and
presence are lurking, even at an infinite remove. Thenon-originary background
of spacing and differing in time, while it has made the thinking of presence
possible, simultaneously makes the actuality of presence, the realization of the
Idea in the Kantian sense, impossible. As we stated in the previous section, the
absolute impossibility of presence, death itself, fuels the economy of classical
semiosis; the everyday uncritical and unproblematic semiosis of presence can
only operate in the face of an irremediable absence. However, the proper taking
up of this critical analysis of origins that Derrida offers in Speech and Phenome!1"
demands more of us than an indifferent acceptance of our day-to-day life
founded on the metaphysics of presence, or even Husserlian phenomenology.
Rather it reveals to us a responsibility to reject the "nostalgia" for returning to
a "lost fatherland of thought" and to resist giving ourselves over to those ways
42
of thinking which presuppose such a "fatherland" as either its origin or telos.

In light of this brief exposition on differance we can better understand how
Derrida's approach to the question of Europe is akin to Husserl's in that they
both demand that our naive assumptions be reflected upon and overturned.
The demand that Derrida forwards, however, goes beyond Husserl's in that
Husserl directed his criticisms at the answers being offered to the question:
what is Europe? Derrida's point is that we have to begin our thinking before we
form the question and, thus, submit the question itself to interrogationY
Derrida's essay on the topic of Europe, The Other Heading, is just such an exercise
in critical non-technological thinking which eschews the taking up of the readymade axioms of our day. Once we begin, as we have throughout this essay, to
question the question of European identity itself, then we can begin to rethink
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the alarm of the "spiritual" crisis of 1935 and 1993, and thereby reflect upon
Europe in a more responsible way.
The possibility of recognizing Europe to be in a state of crisis, as Husserl
does, is founded on the belief that in Europe there is an entity to which we
should be faithful, and whose dissolution would be a true loss of being as well
as a loss of a promise for the future. In The Other Heading Derrida describes the
situation of Europe in the following tenns:
Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are
coming to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the
name of identity, be it cultural or not, the worst violences, those that
we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through,
the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism, are being unleashed, mixed up, mixed up with each
other, but also, and there is nothing fortuitous in this, mixed in with
the breath, with the respiration, with the very"spirit" of the promise."
F.ach group, each faction, each subculture of the European continent is acting
outofaresponsibilitythatitlocateswithin the"spiritualgeography" of Europe.
What Europe is to these various factions is not a sphere of indeterminate
po$ibility, but a promise of a certain identity and way of being. Variously,
Europe is taken, both in its origin and its telos, to be: a universal and cosmopolitan culture; a harbor for the displaced and homeless people of the surrounding
territories; a locale for the unrestricted condensation of economic wealth; a
homeland for a quasi-Aryan race; a collection of various independentlydirected and ethnically-defined nation-states; and so on. In today's scenario,
Husserl's call for an Europe founded on a genuine humanity of original
thinkers would be but one call amidst the rest. Further, Husserl's voice would
be but one amidst the crowd yelling "Crisis!"; what motivates Husserl's call,
and all of these others, is a fearful vision of the possibility of the finitude of the
promise of that particular Europe which is for them Europe itself.•5 The
recognition of crisis can arise from no other situation than the one in which the
construct of the metaphysics of presence demands that we formulate the
statement: Europe is x. Once that step of thinking of Europe as a pure entity is
made the situation in Europe becomes a contest for the very being of Europe in
which the advent of change always provokes the moment of crisis, the potential
lo$ of being.
While in this essay Derrida refers to this thinking within the construct of the
metaphysics of presence as "capital thinking," as thinking of an origin or a
:en~~, we can also term such approaches to the topic of Europe as be~g
spintual thinking." In contrast to this approach, we have what Demda
recommends in Speech and Phenomena and elsewhere: the reflection upon
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dijferance, non-original thinking, thinking otherwise, or non-spiritual thinking.
To think in this manner, to find ourselves "thinking at last," on the topic of
Europe, will necessitate that we perform the sort of phenomenological nonreduction on the notion of Europe as we performed on Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology. The result will be the realization that, as Derrida notes, rather
than the call of crisis being the call to preserve the "life" of Europe, the call only
reveals Europe's own "refined taste for finality, for the end, if not for death."46
In The Other Heading Derrida does not pursue a rigorous phenomenological analysis of Europe in order to reveal the impossibility of thinking of Europe
as an entity. Instead the essay proceeds from two axioms which are the product
of the two-level analysis which was explored in the previous section and
Derrida established in Speech and Phenomena. The first axiom which Derrida
announces is contained, in part, in the epigram with which we began this essay:
that the possibility of a "re-unification" of Europe, of Europe's returning to
itself,itsproperidentity,isnotpossibleinthatEuropehasneverbeenandcould
never be such a unified and self-present object.47 Europe, insofar as it is locatable
and significant, is revealed through differentiation and a structure of archewriting (dijferance) which employs spacing and absence. Further, the pursuit of
Europe-either into the past or into the future-will rely on the dynamics of
semiosis which structurally necessitate the deferral of the possibility of the
fully-present object such a "Europe." The second axiom Derrida states sharply
as: "what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself."48 As in our
discussion of what would identify Husserl's living present, we find that a
culture which became completely self-reflexive and self-identifying in an
undifferentiated way would, actually, be the ve:ty annihilation of itself; the
perfect gathering of European culture in upon itself would represent its total
eclipse. What generates life, meaning, and significance is differentiation within
a culture. Thus, to the contrary of those factions which are calling for a retum
to the spirit of Europe as a way of preventing the death of the continent as a
~~tual ~tity, this call for a "true Europe," a ''Europe for Europeans," is a
flirting with the actual negation of Europe.
This consideration of the topic of Europe under the heading of Derrida's
non-original thinking reveals to us, not only the dangers contained in pursuing
~e "pro~e" of European identity, but the logical impossibility of the promise
itself. Taking heed of these two axioms, then, the call to come to the defense of
"Europe" does not raise our fervor, but incites us to question. The presentation
of the ~~estion, "What is Europe?" provokes us to question the question and
look cntically upon all those who rush forward to answer the question with
re~dy-ma~e responses. The structure of the betrayal of Europe was initially
witn~d m Husserl's.a~onition regarding the failure to respect the "is" or
the capital (reserve/ ongm/telos) of Europe. Upon Derrida's revision of ph~
nomenology, the betrayal of Europe is now constituted in respecting that

disClosure: Fin de Siecle Democracy

capital, that origin, to the exclusion of its contraries.
Ibelieve,rather,thatthiseventtakesplaceasthatwhichcomes,asthat
which seeks or promises itself today, in Europe, the today of a Europe
whose borders are not given-no more than its name, Europe being
here only a paleonymic appellation. I believe that if there is any event
today, it is taking place here, in this act of memory that consists in
betraying a certain order of capital in order to be faithful to the other
heading and the other of the heading. And this is happening at a
moment for which the word crisis, the crisis of Europe, the crisis of
spirit, is perhaps no longer appropriate. 49
To reflect upon Europe and to remember Europe in a non-technological way is
to begin to dissolve crisis-thinking. In our non-original thinking on the topic of
Europe what we find is a memo:ty of Europe which demands a certain
faithfulness from us. That memo:ty, if we reflect properly, will show us a Europe
that does not have a pure origin and that has never been a pure identity.
Heterogeneity has" constituted" Europe and a faithful keeping of that memory
will resist the movement toward a European identity founded on the desire for ·
homogeneity or any notion of a pure identity.50
Once we reconceive the European "identity" upon the ''basis" of dijferance,
the significance and appropriateness of the term "crisis" begins to fade. Crisis
can only appear when the possibility of true loss is recognized. Insofar as we
rethink Europe, not as a pure being which can be lost or preserved, but as a
relation of differences and distinctions (a system of writing) which mutually
depend on one another to form what we call Europe, we can no longer see
Europe as being in a state of crisis. Indeed, in that we have located the
significance of Europe in there being an-other heading and an other in the very
heading of Europe, to awaken the metaphysical cry of "Crisis!" would only be
~ act of betrayal and the jeapordization of that Europe which is necessarily
Wl~out an origin. We only pay heed to the "spirit": of Europe, to Husserl's
notion of the "spirituality" of the continent, at the risk of degrading or losing
"Europe" itself.

,

This analysis of the European situation and of the phenomenology of the

'Eur~pean identity" suggests to us that Husserl's own presentation of the
question of Europe, rather than leading us out of the situation of the darkness
of pre-World War II Europe, is itself only a symptom of the metaphysical ·
culture which made that crisis-and its various "solutions"-possible. Thus,
when Husserl states that "the spiritual need of our time has, in fact, become
un~e~able," his voice does not provide a counter-point to that of the National
Socralists, but is actually working within the same ontological framework as
that barbarism.51 Husserl's contention with the National Socialists, and with all
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of the factions of barbarism, was not a clash of ontological paradigms, but a
struggle for hegemony within the paradigm of the metaphysics of presence; all
the factions had a vision of what the essence of Europe was and what its spiritual
goal ought to be. While we must end any co~parison of Husserl's position to
thethatofNationalSocialistsatthispoint,itisclearthatHU$erlwascommitted
to the very same form of argument as were his foes: the battle over essence. To
think about Europe within the framework of crisis, however, is only to commit
oneself to the unending factionalism, divisiveness, and struggle for the "true"
European identity which Husserl took himself to be working against. Thinking
of crisis, crisis thinking, is not the point of departure from that situation, but the
very creation of the problem.
Non-Spiritual Responsibilities and Democracy
Derrida's reading of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and of
contemporary Europe calls on us to forsake crisis thinking and the metaphysics
of presence that undergirds it.Yet, while we are to resist describing the situation
of Europe as one of crisis, this does not mean that we cannot speak of there being
important and crucial issues in Europe, issues which should concem Europeans
and others. Indeed, in the writing of The Other Heading, Derrida confirms the
importance of tjl.inking about and acting politically with respect to Europe. The
critique of original thinking and the shift to non-original thinking does not
signify the end of ethical thinking or political engagement; critics of the
popularizations of Derrida's thought and all that passes as "deconstruction"
aside, non-original thinking is not nihilism.

To underscore this point, and to get to the matter most directly, it is to be
recalled that Derrida's short es.say is most critically- and Derrida uses this
word frequently throughout the text-about responsibility. Derrida writes:
Now, we must ourselves be responsible for this discourse of the
modem tradition. We must bear the responsibility for this heritage,
rightalongwith thecapitalizingmemorythatwehaveofit. Wedidnot
choose this responsibility; it imposes itself upon us, and in an even
more imperative way in that it is, as other, and from the other, the
language of our language.52
Once the phenomenological critique of the notion of "origin" has been per·
formed our responsibilities are not lost but are altered. We become responsible
for a Europe-the memory of a Europe-of which and in which there is no
origin to be located. We become responsible for a Europe that has always
appeared and been significant precisely for the fact of the other "outside" of its
borders and because of the alterity which has been "inside" Europe itself. This,
then, is the responsibility that is irresponsible; 53 in its irresponsibility to that
Europe which provokes calls of crisis, this rethinking of Europe is recognizing
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and living its responsibility. In this way we leave behind Husserl's call to take
up our spiritual responsibilities to Europe and, rather, consider our nonspiritual responsibilities. While Derrida enumerates a short list of duties to
which this rethinking of Europe commits us, the simplest and most figuratively
powerful given our time and place, is this: ''but not to close off in advance the
border to the future, to the to-come of the event, to that which comes, which
comes perhaps and perhaps comes from a completely other shore."54
Within the European context, and beyond, the general tendency has been
to designate as fascistic those forces or thoughts which would oppose this
general form of non-spiritual responsibility. The desire to close one's borders to
the other not of one's origin or heading, and the desire to seek to maintain a
purity of identity are certainly an outgrowth of a fascistic attitude or ideology.
Given the limitations of our political vocabulary and the diadic structure of
political discourse since 1945, the reaction of most opponen ts of these fascistic
attitudes is to promote what goes under the general title of "democracy." One
of the most prominent rallying cries of those groups opposed to the "nationalistic" forces within and without the governments of western Europe has been
for an "open and democratic" society. And it would seem that many of the
features of democracy, asitis currently understood, do provide a counter-point
to such explicitly political forms of the metaphysics of presence as instanced in
fascism. The universal right of suffrage, the formulation of policy by vote and
not by decree, negative rights to check the hegemony of state and majority
interests: these all go a long way toward resisting the forces of homogeneity
which seektoobliteratedifferencesin the pursuit of a "true" identity. Yet, while
the support of democracy is undoubtedly efficacious in light of the political
situation in Europe, it is still worthwhile to ask a further question. If we have
taken the effort to pursue Derrida's question regarding Husserl's question of
European humanity, then it is only proper that we pause and ask whether these
"democratic solutions" are in keeping with our task of non-original thinking.
So.n~w, byway ofconclusion, we ask: is thepursuitof democracy a formofnonspmtual responsibility?
When we begin to actually think about democracy, particularly after
P~uing the dynamic of Derrida's phenomenology, we find that, rather than
being an antidote to the metaphysics of presence, democracy appears to operate
on~~ very same presuppositions as does fascism: identity, life, a unity of being.
This lS the case in both the French/ Rousseauean and British/ Lockean democratic traditions. Derrida's differences with Rousseau are well-known since
Derrida made this paradigmatic figure of communitarian-Enlightenment
~ought the subject of critique in working out the principles of a grammatology
~the t~xt, Of Grammatology. The force of Rousseau's thought-which, revealingly, influenced the political philosophy of both Kant (the cosmopolis of
reason) and Hegel (the all-encompassing coming to be of the Idea)-was to see
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the political state as self-defining force whose highest aim was to converge on
a single unanimously affirmed identity. While there was no predetermined
identity which stood before Rousseau's polis as a fixed goal, the democratic
process was established as the one mechanism by which these diverse wills
could cease to be different and would unite as a singular entity. The "force of
law," upon Rousseau's reading, is derived from law's being identical w ith the
general will; that is, legal legitimacy flowed from the law's being a reflection of
the collective self of the polis.ss Democracy functions as the procedure by which
this self-reflexive law-and, thus, the possibility of justice-can come into
being.
Lockean notions of democracy, being far more libertarian than
communitarian or socialist in orientation, appear to differ quite significantly
from those of Rousseau. More pessimistic about the possibilities of h uman
association, Locke takes democracy to be a mechanism adopted to best adjudicate the clash of self-legislating wills. Democracy is not on the way toward
justice, but is a way of protecting certain fundamental rights of citizens. Justice
is attained by having good fences (laws) and these allow us to muddle through
a bad situation with the as.sent of a majority of people. In Locke's case the selflegislating and, thus, lawful body is the individual self, and not the polis.
However, the similarity with Rousseau resides in the fact that law, insofar as it
is legitimate, continues to be a reflection of the identity of the rational individual. Democracy's concern, as that mode of political association which
roughly equates the government with the will of the "people," is being true to
the identity of the "people." Law is founded on its relation to being, and laws
thus founded provide us with justice.
These two, brief portraits are admittedly reductive and gloss over complexities in the thought of both Rousseau and Locke. However, these sketches
are adequate insofar as w e are concerned with these two main Enlightenment
traditions as they have been handed down to us and how they inform our
contemporary notions about democracy. And, given these sketches, it would
appear that there is a real disjunction between our non-spiritual responsibilities
and those responsibilities we undertake in a democratic state. Both democracy
understood as a growth toward a collective self-defining identity and as a
system instituted to best protect and respect a self-defining identity are profoundly irresponsible by the measure of non-original thinking. Both, in their
desire for totality and closure are instances of what we have already noted to be
Europe's "refined taste for finality, for the end, if not for death." They both
ori~t their whole ~ction and distribution of value according to the presence
of being and do their best to make being one with itself. The goal is always unity,
the "people" being at one with itself. Democracy, as traditionally understood,
never seeks dispersion or an irremediable alterity.

Admittedly, Rousseau's version of democracy is somewhat out of fashion;
those who seek such social and political convergence (for example, the "Slovaks," the "Croats," the "Belarusians") typically bypass the consensual process
toward unanimity and seek a simple majority vote, if not a decree, to establish
the final result. Yet, in many of the calls for "democratic" responses to fascistic
actions or policies in Europe we certainly can find a Lockean understanding at
work. Here proponents of democracy seek to protect the other by invoking
some version of negative rights, a respect for the sovereign identity of the other.
This form of democratic process is motivated by a fundamental sense of the
unity, autonomy, and self-defining quality of the individual. Thus, against
tendencies to collapse differences around narrow notions of identity guided by
ethnicity or race, others might be welcomed (e.g., suffrage could be expanded
or refugees could be accepted). This "openness" and "receptivity" to the other,
however, is guided by a metaphysics of presence which equates the singular
other with being and because of this identity is deemed to be worthy of respect.
What results from this generally Lockean or liberal conception of democracy, as Habermas and others have so correctly noted, is that democratic society
becomes an utilitarian market place of political wills. In this market, political
wills are collected, weighed against one another, and justice provided upon the
basis of the metaphysical law. Each individual speaks with his or her indissoluble and singular voice and, then, awaits the result of the elaborate compromise which is the promise that the democratic process proposes to deliver. 56
Upon reflection it is evident that we have not, in fact, come that far from Locke's
Second Treatise of 1698. Hardly a strong commitment to the sort of indeterminate
openness which the attempt to think of differance elicits, this democratic
posture is a technique for efficiently administrating the to-come of the future.
Moreover, any "democratic solution" to the ideologies of racial or ethnic
id~tity, so long as it derives its impetus from the inviolability of the individual
betng, a being present, continues to be a contest for dominance within the field
of the metaphysics of presence; it is a struggle to name what that individual is,
to the exclusion of all other names. To call for "democracy" in the face of
"fascism," then, falls well short of the shift of ethical and political registers that
non-spiritual thinking requires.
The promise of democracy, as "we Europeans" currently understand it, is,
then, to adjudicate the relations of self-possessed and inviolable monads;
democracy is a way-and perhaps still the best way-of being responsible
toward human entities, beings. Yet, our being responsible, our non-spiritual
responsibilities demand more of us than being technically proficient in the
ways of laws and rights. Derrida writes in Force ofLaw:The 'Mystical Foundations

ofJustice':
The sense of responsibility without limits, and so necessarily exces-
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sive, incalculable, before memory; and so the task of recalling the
history, the origin and subsequent direction, thus the limits of concepts of justice, the law and law (droit), values, norms, prescriptions
that have been imposed and sedimented there, from then on remaining more or less readable or presupposed.57
Democracy, as a political program and as an ethical commitment, has its
limitations in that it comes to determinate answers, fixes upon prescriptions,
and promotes a technical law and a technicity of lawfulness. The limitation of
democracy as we currently understand it is that it cannot begin to attempt to
think of differance; closedness to differance and to the irremediable non-origin in
absence is a prerequisite for the common commitment to democracy. Democracy is fulfilling its responsibilities in providing us with justice when it executes
the law, thelawwhichiserected upon the basic premises of human dignity. Yet,
the unlimited responsibility of our non-spiritual thinking before differance
demands that we serve justice by interrogating law and the "justice" it provides. 58 The practise of this unlimited interrogation Derrida calls deconstruction,
and its commitment is to the form of justice which, unlike justice before the state
or before "man," in principle can never be served. This sense of the unlimited
suggests the justice of differance. 59

If democracy is to be maintained as a responsible political attitude-and it
is not at all clear that our thinking of democracy can withstand this revisionthen it must be a democracy which incorporates non-original thinking into its
practise. What Derrida is pointing toward in The Other Heading, then, is an
attempt at understanding democracy as an ethical and political practise which
has "the structure of a promise":
The same dutv dictates assuming the European, and uniquely European, heritag of an idea of democracy, while also recognizing that
this idea, like that of international law, is never simply given, that its
status is not even that of a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, but
rather something that remains to be thought and to come [a venir]: not
something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy
(national or international, state or trans-state) of the future, but a
democracy which must have the structure of a promise-and thus the

memory of that which carries the"future, the to-come, here and now.60
Unlike our current notion of democracy which represents an economy for
managing being or the relations amongst self-possessed beings, the main
concern of this new democracy, or "democracy," is not any particular promise,
but the form of the promise, the maintenance of the promise of the unexpected
and unknown. The ethical and political task of "democracy" becomes to
cultivate this space in which phenomena can take shape. Thus the commitment
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to the to-come, avenir, is not precisely a commitment to, say, multiculturalism,
or freedom of speech, or the irreducible dignity of persons; all of these ethical
commitments fall on the side of the metaphysics of presence. Rather, this
responsibility for the to-come of the future is ''based" on a commitment to
thinking otherwise, the thinking of limits, the impossible thinking of the nontranscendental condition of appearances which is differance. The concern, as
Derrida notes, isnotwithanyparticularwayofbeingor language, butwith "the
language of our language."

For these reasons it is proper to answer our question by stating that this
"democracy" that is of "the structure of a promise" is not democracy in any
traditional sense. The deconstructive practices which exemplify non-spiritual
thinking do not grow out of traditional democratic thought, not even dialectically. Rather, non-spiritual thinking is concerned with the moment before
democratic thinking and practice; the move from democracy to deconstruction
is not simply a matter of criticism, but a shifting of registers. Derrida does not
want to debate within the metaphysics of presence, but to change the matter of
discussion. This "democracy," a "democracy" of the promise, is neither any
current political system or ethical program nor is it of any to come, even at an
infinite remove. 61
The notion of "democracy'' of the form of a promise exceeds or escapes
democracy. !tis about thinking what Derrida calls a "double bind": not to think
of simple presence, but also not to think simple alterity or dispersion. 62 Yet, this
form of thinking, since it involves a thinking about that which is neither an
object nor a concept (differance), is approaching the impossible. "Democracy,"
as non-spiritual thinking and a desire for justice as differance, necessarily cannot
be packaged in any ethical or political program. As Derrida notes in Force ofLaw:
I think that there is no justice without this experience, however
impossible it may be, of aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn't
be an experience of aporia would have no chance to be what it is,
namely, a call for justice.. . . Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element
of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable,
it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of
justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision between just
and unjust is never insured by a rule. 63
The very character of this double bind which is found in /1 democracy" calls for
a two level response in which, both, democracy and /1 democracy" have a place.
The maintenance of a liberal democracy, and of the technical law which it
requires, is a deviant but valuable political attitude insofar as we fail, as we
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undoubtedly will, to consistently think non-spiritually. The necessary disjunction between formulaic or programmatic thought and non-spiritual thinking
means that we have to have a serious concern for our everyday modes of
thought; "democracy" cannot become an everyday way of thought, but we
cannot escape the everyday. In its affirmation of the individual against the
totality and in its respect for the other, then, liberal democracy has a special role
to fulfil in our day-to-day, metaphysically-grounded life. Liberal democracy,
unlike other political attitudes that could be characterized as despotic or
fascistic, has a concern-albeit a metaphysical concern-for the particular, the
other, and the alter. Liberal democracy protects and thinks about the elements
of justice, but in its unavoidable systemization of its thinking cannot do justice
to them. In this way, as Derrida remarks, this formal legality and technical
democracy fails to be just, yet is indispensable insofar as it outlines some of the
concerns of non-spiritual responsibility and provides the space in which
responsibility can be practised.64

Epilogue as Prologue
This moment, of course, is just the beginning of the topic. The whole of this
essay stands as an introduction in that it has only served to bring us to the point
where the most serious work begins: the work of living the technical or political
commitment to democracy and the non-spiritual commitment to "democracy"
as maintenance of the promise or condition of the to-come. However, it has been
an important task to bring the writings and thought of Derrida into a space in
which we can see his work as having ethical and political significance, not just
accidentally or sporadically, but as a consistent effort since the beginning of the
critique of Husserlian phenomenology with the writing of his Introduction to
Husserl's Origin of Geometry. Moreover, this examination of Derrida's work
should serve to revitalize our thinking on Europe and disrupt our tendency to
conceive of the situation in the dyadic terms of democracy or fascism. The
proposal of "democracy" or non-spiritual responsibility is one which eschews
solutions and commits itself to an ongoing questioning beyond all technical
considerations. The coercion of technical ways of life and the terror of definition
. and marginalization are undermined by this mode of questioning which is not
aimed at any possible solution but represents the activity of justice itself. As
such, we can begin to see--contrary to the critics who point to the "crisis" of
"nihilism" that deconstruction portends-the way in which non-spiritual
thinking, precisely because of its avoidance of "solutions," is of ethical and
political importance.
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